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One Right Answer?: The Meta Edition 
Dan Priel* 
Sir James Stephen is not the only writer whose attempts to 
analyze legal ideas have been confused by striving for a 
useless quintessence of all systems, instead of an accurate 
anatomy of one.1 
Introduction 
Let me start with two quotes that look, and indeed are, very far from discussions of the 
nature of law:  
[%e members of Obama’s economic team’s] faith in the power of analysis remained 
unshaken. Obama believed … that knotty public policy problems had right answers and 
wrong answers and that if you put enough smart people on the problem, you could usually 
get to the right answer.”2  
%is disconnection from the world was the malign consequence of the American love of 
expertise, which, with the help of citadels of the meritocracy, had moved from a mere 
culture to something approaching a cult. Obama was skeptical of cant but still in thrall to 
the idea that with enough analysis, there was a “right answer” to everything.3  
Could the “American love of expertise” and the belief that “with enough analysis, 
there was a ‘right answer’ to everything” have anything to do with debates in 
jurisprudence? Is it even appropriate to suggest that the conceptual debates of the nature 
of law, debates that purport to take place above the concerns of the here and now have 
anything to do with the everyday a5airs that make up real-life politics? In this essay I will 
suggest that the answer may be, “yes, they do.” 
%e immediate instigation for this discussion is, of course, Ronald Dworkin’s “right 
answer thesis.”4 For some time during the late s and early s Dworkin’s claim 
that there are uniquely right answers to virtually all legal questions was the subject of 
heated debate. But as debates of this sort are prone to, it eventually ran out of steam, 
* Visiting Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School (-); Assistant Professor, University of
Warwick School of Law. Email: dpriel@osgoode.yorku.ca. %is essay will be presented at the Nature of 
Law Conference at McMaster University, May . %is is work in progress; comments are welcome.  
1 O.W. Holmes, “%e Path of the Law,”  Harvard Law Review ,  (). 
2 Jonathan Alter, e Promise: President Obama, Year One (New York: Simon And Schuster, ) 
. 
3 Ibid. at . 
4 See, among other places, Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, ) ch. . 
 
though neither side convinced the other of the error of its ways. It may therefore seem a 
bit odd to return to this topic now. If I do so, it is because I wish to examine it from an 
angle that I think it has not yet been looked at, and which I think is relevant to some 
debates that are very much alive these days. More speciQcally, I will argue that there is 
something about the right answer thesis that Qts a certain view prevalent in American 
political culture about politics and (consequently) about the relationship between law and 
politics, and that this view is quite di5erent from the British mainstream view about law 
and politics. %e more general and more important goal of this essay is to challenge the 
underlying idea of the search for the nature of law, at least so long as it is understood as a 
conceptual inquiry that purports to tell something about law outside the di5erent political 
and cultural environments in which di5erent legal systems operate. Somewhat 
surprisingly, many of the very same legal theorists who have argued vigorously against 
the view that there is a single right answer to legal questions accepted (or actually, 
assumed) such a view is correct at the meta-level question of the nature of law. I think this 
is assumption is mistaken, and my essay is an attempt to explain why. 
Changing Places 
Returning from his year in the United States Hart recorded his impressions of the United 
States for the BBC. %ese were then published in the BBC’s magazine e Listener. %is 
short piece, “A View of America,” reRects Hart’s astonishment with what he saw in the 
United States. Coming from a country that was still slowly recovering from two wars that 
had leS it practically bankrupt, the essay tells us about the tall buildings, the wide roads, 
the big cars, and the resourceful universities. %e essay also contains some pertinent 
comments about American politics and how di5erent they were from what he was used to 
at home. One thing that particularly impressed Hart was  
the passion inspiring so many whom you meet for the moral issue. Argument soon breaks 
through to what is believed, apparently, to be at the root of every problem—a moral 
problem. And, more widespread than I could have believed, was the conviction that just as 
there lurks at the bottom of problem a moral question, so there must somewhere be 
an answer, an answer perhaps for the sage—and he may be in the university—to provide.5  
%is is a fairly neat summary of Dworkin’s right answer thesis. It would not be so 
surprising to those who know something about the debates that would come to dominate 
legal philosophy in the following decades had it not been for the fact that Hart wrote this 
5 H.L.A. Hart, “A View of America,”  Listener ,  (). Surprisingly, even though Nicola 
Lacey discusses this little essay at some length in A Life of H.L.A. Hart: e Nightmare and the Noble 
Dream (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ) -, she does not mention this remarkable passage. 
 
some Qve years before Ronald Dworkin published his Qrst article. And yet Hart was not 
talking here not about American law but on American politics. %is, as I will try to show 
below, is not a coincidence.  
Unlike Hart who only made a few visits to the United States, Dworkin lived and 
taught in Britain for many years.6 But he always remained, I think, a relative outsider to 
the legal and political culture in Britain. He has been, for example, a frequent 
commentator on American constitutional cases in the New York Review of Books, but to 
the best of my knowledge has never written a similar essay on a British case. He has seen 
enough, however, to note the di5erences between in the political cultures of the two 
countries, writing once that “public debate in the United States is dominated, to a degree 
British commentators Qnd surprising, by discussion of what rights people have.”7 
Dworkin’s most detailed discussion of British law and politics is found in a relatively 
unknown pamphlet (or is it a book?) entitled A Bill of Rights for Britain. Summarized in a 
sentence, in this essay Dworkin recommends that Britain’s law and politics be turned into 
something more-or-less like their American counterparts. In order for people to 
“participate in government … constantly through informed and free debate … 
Parliament must be constrained in certain ways in order that democracy be genuine 
rather than a sham.”8 Such a change, he suggested might make “[l]aw and lawyers … 
begin to play a di5erent, more valuable role in [British] society than they now even aim to 
have.” It would encourage courts to “think more in terms of principle and less in terms of 
narrow precedent.” Such a change would help foster “a legal profession that could be the 
conscience, not just the servant, of government and industry.”9 In short, Dworkin 
recognized that there are fundamental di5erences in the political culture of Britain and 
the United States, and that those had fundamental implications for the way lawyers 
perceived their role in society.  
6 I used “Britain” throughout this essay, despite the fact that the term may be deemed misleading, 
since for the most part I am talking here more about England. Precision had to be given up here for 
simplifying the discussion. %ose troubled by this usage are entitled to mentally read “England” and 
“English” wherever I write “Britain” and “British.” %ough less loaded, “American law” is not free from 
diZculties either. Again, I stuck with this phrase aware of its imprecision. I believe that in neither case 
does my choice of word get in the way of my argument. 
7 Dworkin, supra note , at -. 
8 Ronald Dworkin, A Bill of Rights for Britain (London: Chatto & Windus, )  (emphasis in 
original). Incidentally, these days Dworkin has somewhat soSened his views on judicial review. See 
Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, ) -. 
9 Ibid. at . 
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Two Ways to the Rule of Law 
I want to suggest that these reRections on the political di5erences between the United 
States and Britain that both Hart and Dworkin noticed are relevant to legal philosophy. 
At this stage I will phrase my argument as weakly as I can: since law interacts with 
politics, the fact that di5erent political communities have di5erent conceptions of politics 
is likely to have an impact on their conception of law. I will examine this argument in the 
context of one aspect of the rule of law, namely that of the requirement that the content of 
the law is not a5ected by the identity of the person charged with saying what it is. %is 
sense is sometimes captured by the slogan “the rule of law and not of men,” and is 
associated with one sense of objectivity, that of non-perspectival constancy or invariance. 
Put in everyday terms, it is the demand that if di5erent people are asked to state what the 
law requires on a particular question, will o5er the same answer. (%is, of course, is not 
the only sense of the rule of law.) 
When legal philosophers address the question they usually do so by trying to connect 
debates about objectivity in law to the subtle and sophisticated discussions of objectivity 
among philosophers where the topic has been front and center of virtually every Qeld of 
philosophy. %ese jurisprudential contributions provided important correctives to those 
who considered any claims about the possibility of objective knowledge (in law, in 
general) as naïve or even reactionary. However, in focusing on the question of objectivity 
in this epistemological and metaphysical context they shiSed attention away from the 
issues that lawyers are mostly interested in. For lawyers do not usually wonder about 
whether Truth exists, or what reality consists of. %ey are, however, intensely interested, 
practically interested, in potential problems that could undermine objectivity in the 
particular sense I associated with the rule of law. %e worry is that people’s personal 
(possibly unconscious) prejudices, their political opinions, or cultural background, will 
a5ect their determination of the law thus undermining the possibility of invariance 
among di5erent people. %e unique problem of objectivity in law can thus be 
summarized as follows: () law should be (in the speciQc sense explained above) objective; 
() law (in modern society) primarily deals with questions that deal, directly or indirectly, 
with the relationship between individual and the state; () questions of this sort are oSen 
politically controversial, and therefore () law’s objectivity is in danger. What emerges 
from these three propositions is that, especially in the modern welfare state, there is 
tension between the aims for objectivity in the law and its subject-matter.  
Setting up the problem at this level of abstraction is fairly easy. What makes Qnding a 
solution to it diZcult is that the issue is not simply one of Qnding the optimal design of 
legal institutions to minimize a clearly set problem. Part of the diZculty arises from the 
fact that the understanding of the problem itself changes in di5erent political 
 
environments, and therefore there are several possible ways of understanding what would 
count as a successful solution. One way of understanding my argument below is that we 
can identify a di5erence in the mainstream legal academic positions in Britain and the 
United States not simply about the means of achieving the optimal level of separating 
between law and politics, but rather on what that level should be. To complete my 
argument about the error in the way debates about the nature of law are currently 
conducted I will need to show, Qrst, that determining this matter is relevant to debates 
about the nature of law, and second, that these di5erent answers to this matter, and as a 
result di5erent understandings of the nature of law, are going to be given in di5erent legal 
systems if their political cultures are di5erent. I will make exactly this argument later on, 
but Qrst I will specify in more detail the way the British and the American legal systems 
have responded to the problem of objectivity speciQed above.  
The British Response 
%e traditional, and still typical, response in Britain to the potential challenge that politics 
poses to the rule of law is to insist on a categorical separation of law and politics. “%e 
matter of legal science,” wrote Pollock and Maitland, “is not an ideal result of ethical or 
political analysis; it is the actual result of facts of human nature and history.”10 %is 
distinction is maintained through the more-or-less conscious adoption of various 
institutional means aimed at minimizing the potential inQltration of politics into the law, 
and no less importantly, of law into politics. Some of these means for achieving that are 
rather familiar, others perhaps less so. I mention a few of them here:  
() e doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy. In the course of a discussion of the 
di5erences between the United States and Britain Hart wrote how the “defenders of the 
British government’s policy had come to think not merely that Parliament had unlimited 
legislative powers as a matter of English constitutional law but that it was a general 
necessary and indeed self-evident truth that government by law could not be limited by 
law.”11 In presenting this view like that Hart wants to show that though the matter was 
thought to be conceptual, it was merely a reRection of a particular political choice, one 
that could be easily refuted by pointing, as Hart himself did in his critique of Austin, to 
10  Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Maitland, e History of English Law before the Time of 
Edward I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ) xxiii. Notice that this strict separation 
between between declaring law and changing it, and between (descriptive) jurisprudence and 
(normative) moral and political theory as the respective domains of inquiry for these questions, is also a 
linchpin of contemporary legal positivism. %is is very clear in Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, rev. ed., ) , . 








the United States as a counterexample.12 %e truth, however, is that though there were 
some who sought to present the matter in this conceptual fashion, the opposition to legal 
limitations on Parliamentary power was normative. To its proponents Parliamentary 
sovereignty was a good idea.13 One good thing to come from Parliamentary sovereignty is 
a smaller likelihood that courts will be embroiled in political questions and in this way 
making sure the objectivity of law is not compromised.  
() Judicial deference to government action. For a long time British law contained a 
kind of sneering attitude toward the (French, obviously) idea of administrative law. 
Dicey, still probably the most inRuential public lawyer in Britain today, almost a century 
aSer his death, doubted whether it was even appropriate to talk of British law containing 
anything that could properly be described as administrative law.14 British public servants 
could be liable in civil courts if their actions fell within the scope of private civil liability, 
but there was no place for any other rules beyond that. %is approach has resulted in a 
judicial mindset that was described by one legal historian as one of “total deference to the 
executive.”15 A wide doctrine of justiciability, an almost uninterrupted discretion to 
public authorities (under what British public lawyers call “Wednesbury 
unreasonableness”),16 and narrow scope for tort liability of public authorities, have all 
served to keep executive action relatively free from legal oversight. Of course, one can 
Qnd examples of all that in other places as well, but in comparison to courts in other 
Western democracies, and more speciQcally in comparison with American courts, in 
much of the twentieth century British courts were remarkably timid.17  
                                                          
12 H.L.A. Hart, e Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, nd ed., ) -. Many others 
have made this point against Austin before Hart. See, e.g.,  James Bryce, Studies in the History of 
Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ) -; Henry Sidgwick, e Elements of Politics, 
(London: Macmillan, nd ed., ) -.  
13 For a summary of the overwhelmingly political arguments against such limitations, Je5rey 
Goldsworthy, e Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
) -. 
14 A.V. Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London: 
Macmillan, ) - (“the notion which lies at the bottom of the ‘administrative law’ known to 
foreign countries … is utterly unknown to the law of England.”). 
15 Robert Stevens, Law and Politics: e House of Lords as a Judicial Body, - (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, ) , also ibid. at - (“parliamentary sovereignty implied 
that there should be no serious judicial questioning not only of acts of Parliament, but of decisions of 
the Civil Service”). 
16 So called aSer Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation, []  K.B.  
(C.A.). 
17 See generally, Robert Stevens, e English Judges: eir Role in the Changing Constitution (rev. 








() Focus on doctrine in legal education and legal scholarship. What does it mean to be 
a good lawyer? In the best known British law schools this still means, to a degree that 
would astound American law professors, mastering a vast amount of legal rules by 
reading a breathtaking number of cases, while giving relatively little consideration to 
question of social policy. In a kind of feedback loop mechanism doctrinal legal education 
is both a product of and a mechanism for maintaining the separation of law from politics. 
%is is not merely a matter of legal education: doctrinal, “black-letter” scholarship—from 
the case note to the comprehensive treatise—is a genre still accorded great respect among 
British academics. As a result even what counts as “theoretical” work in Britain is much 
more geared towards “internal” conceptual or taxonomical work than in the United 
States. %is kind of work both by what is found in it, but also but what is not, helps to 
foster the view that law and politics are separate domains. (%e greater dominance of 
analytic jurisprudence in the very same law schools in which the doctrinal study of law is 
dominant is, I think, part of the same phenomenon.)  
The American Response 
%e American scene is di5erent. It is already in the Qrst half of the nineteenth century 
that Tocqueville famously wrote “[t]here is hardly a political question in the United States 
which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one.”18 And this enchantment with law 
has the location for political battle has since intensiQed manifold.  
One source of all these di5erences is the United States Constitution, understood 
primarily as a legal document that empowers courts to declare certain legislation 
unconstitutional. Another has been pointed out by Hart in the very same essay from 
which I quoted above:  
For [the English], surely, liberty is this: that there is a circle round each man, inside which he can do 
as he please, and it is no concern of others; this is the liberty the Englishman has inside his house and 
garden and behind its hedges. I think that this as an ideal makes little appeal to an enormous number 
of Americans; I believe you can Qnd what the American means by liberty by looking at the 
Constitution of an American State. In the State of Massachusetts the Constitution provides that any 
member of the public may introduce a measure into the Legislature and argue for it before 
committees. And it seems to me that this is what an American means by liberty; the right to take part 
in what he would call ‘the decision-making process’.19 
                                                          
18 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America and Two Essays on America (Gerald E. Bevan 
trans., Isaac Kramnick ed., London: Penguin,  [])  (I..). Before Tocqueville Edmund 
Burke has expressed similar ideas. For this and a more general account of pre-Revolutionary American 
legalism see %omas C. Grey, “Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American 
Revolutionary %ought,”  Stanford Law Review , - (). 








Simply put, politics is a more participatory a5air in the U.S. than in Britain, and going to 
court is simply one way of participating in politics in the United States. To be sure, there 
have been many critics, both popular and academic, of the excessive legalism in American 
life, complaining about too many laws, too many lawyers, and too much faith in the 
redeeming powers of law. But these persistent complaints need to be repeatedly made 
exactly because of the staying centrality of law in American political life. %ey need to 
mentioned against the background of statement such as “[l]itigation is an important 
political activity: courts exercise political authority, modify substantive laws, and allocate 
resources. … Litigation declares and changes fundamental cultural values.”20 (It is hard to 
imagine such a statement being made in the British context.) 
%e result of all this is a very di5erent understanding of the relationship between law 
and politics in American law from the way this relationship is understood in Britain. %is 
makes the fears of law becoming indistinguishable from politics more pressing; at the 
same time it implies that many of the institutional solutions for maintaining the rule of 
law that were adopted in British law are simply not available in the United States. %e 
responses adopted in the American context therefore tended to be utterly di5erent. Once 
again I can only mention brieRy a few of them. 
() Giving up: perhaps the most radical response to the diZculty is to give up on the 
attempt to maintain the separation between law and politics. %e nomination proceedings 
of Supreme Court justices are now televised and openly political. In many states judges 
are elected and can be removed from oZce by the public. %ere is a thriving industry of 
scholarship produced by political scientists assessing court decisions in terms of their 
political orientation, and in response to the challenge that the law is political some 
scholars have even openly celebrated “political courts.”21 %e situation in Britain could 
hardly be more di5erent. As one of the few political scientists to take an interest in the 
workings of the courts put it, “[i]t is possible for students of British government to pursue 
their studies in blissful ignorance of the contents of even the existence of the law 
reports.”22 Compared with literally hundreds of books and articles by political scientists 
                                                          
20 Richard L. Abel, “%e Real Tort Crisis—Too Few Claims,”  Ohio State Law Journal , - 
(). Or consider the following words: “American common law is both more democratic and more 
dynamic than its British counterpart. %e people play a larger role in American than in British common 
law, and the common law plays a larger role in the American than in the British system of governance.” 
Carl T. Bogus, Why Lawsuits Are Good for America: Disciplined Democracy, Big Business and the 
Common Law (New York: New York University Press, ) .  
21 See e.g., Terri Jennings Peretti, In Defense of a Political Court (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, ). 
22 Gavin Drewry, “%e GCHQ Case—A Failure of Government Communications,”  








examining the relationship between law and politics in the American context from every 
possible angle, there is an astounding dearth of studies of this sort in Britain. 
() eories of interpretation: the obsession with theories of interpretation at both the 
statutory and constitutional level are a mark of the desire to maintain a way of being able 
to extract the content of law in a way that need not deny the political content of the law. 
Certain approaches such as originalism and textualism present themselves as antidotes to 
the dangers of politicization of the law. Other approaches, like Dworkin’s (whose 
approach I discuss below), address this diZculty by acknowledging the political character 
of the law, but by trying to show how this can be reconciled with the rule of law. Once 
again, it is notable that such debates simply do not exist in the UK.   
() Economic analysis of law (and “theoretical” scholarship more generally): economic 
analysis of law has proven a remarkable success in the United States, but it has not had 
much impact in Britain. It is tempting to explain this disparity with the American 
obsession with theory and contrast it with English anti-intellectualism, but there is, I 
think, a deeper reason for this di5erence. In the British context economic analysis is 
perceived as an alien inRuence that could potentially lead to undermining the integrity of 
the law (its ‘self-understanding’). It is thus not merely pointless, it is potentially 
dangerous. I suspect that the success of economic analysis of law has much to do with the 
need to maintain objectivity in the face of law deeply infused with politics. Since doctrinal 
analysis is no longer perceived as a suZcient barrier from the impact of politics—this is 
the realist legacy that has never had much impact in Britain—at least part of the initial 
enthusiasm with economic analysis has to do with the fact that it seemed to its 
proponents to provide precision and objectivity, something that traditional methods of 
legal reasoning not able to provide.  
*** 
I could list many other ways in which the fundamental di5erence in understanding the 
relationship between law and politics manifest themselves in these two legal systems. 
Political activism in the United States is quite oSen legal activism. %ere is much less of 
that in Britain. (Of course, this may only reRect political activists’ prediction that such a 
course of action would be a waste of time and money; but that is exactly the point.) 
Additional examples include the di5erences in the methods for nominating judges in the 
two countries and the place of law in public discourse (U.S. Supreme Court decisions are 
commonly front page news, but those of its British counterpart much more rarely). If I 
were to summarize the di5erence between the two positions in a sentence I would put it 
this way: the study of the American Constitution is, by and large, a study of American 
                                                                                                                                                               
Political Scientist’s Perspective” in e Judicial House of Lords - (Oxford: Oxford University 








constitutional law; the study of the British constitution is, to a much greater degree, the 
study of British politics.  
No doubt the sketch I o5ered above is very schematic, and on each side there is now 
growing appreciation of the virtues of the opposing view. In Britain even before the 
adoption of the Human Rights Act there were those who sought to Qnd a basis for judicial 
review of legislation in the principles of the common law. In the United States, by 
contrast, aSer years in which judicial review was perceived as the greatest giS American 
politics has bestowed on the world, there are now those who think the U.S. will be better 
o5 without it. But in both cases these are still minority views and they are battling very 
entrenched ideas. It is also possible that British law may be subjected to a kind of “critical 
legal studies” attack that would show that all the mechanisms mentioned above to keep 
law outside politics fail to do so, and British law is no less political than American law. 
And yet at least at the level that legal philosophers seem to be interested in, that of 
oZcials’ attitudes from the internal point of view, the “self-understanding” of British 
law(yers) is fundamentally di5erent from that of American law(yers). 
Back to the Jurisprudential Fray 
I suspect the response of many legal philosophers to what I have said so far will be that it 
is all very interesting, perhaps even true, but that this is not jurisprudence, and has little 
to do with its concerns. For the general view among them is that “in spite of many 
variations in di5erent cultures and in di5erent times, [law] has taken the same general 
form and structure.”23 Most legal philosophers accept, or more precisely assume, the 
correctness of this statement and have therefore leS the sort of matters I discussed in the 
last section to others. Or so it would at Qrst sight seem. In this section I consider the place 
in which this debate has taken place in jurisprudence. I begin by examining the respective 
views of Hart and Dworkin and show that they reRect very di5erent views on this matter, 
and ones that are in accordance with the dominant view on the relationship between law 
and politics in Britain and the United States, respectively. I then turn to another location 
in which the debate may be glimpsed, the debate between inclusive and exclusive legal 
positivists, and I argue that rather than address the issue, this debate highlights the 
limitations of the approach, strongly connected with the nature of law project, that gives 
central place to the question of legal validity. 
                                                          








The Different Ways of Understanding the Connection between Law and Politics 
I started by distinguishing between Hart and Dworkin’s perceptions of the other’s native 
country, and I suggested that their respective theories of law may have been inRuenced by 
their perception in the local ways of the law in their own native country. %is suggestion 
is not usually well respected among legal philosophers; Michael Moore considered it the 
sort of mistake one occasionally hears from students who are just embarking on their 
jurisprudential studies.24 Nonetheless, I will try to demonstrate that there may be deep 
and important truth in this view. 
Consistent with my characterization of the relationship between law and politics in 
Britain, there is in fact very little about the matter in Hart’s work, and whatever is found is 
almost always found in the context of discussing American law. 25  Despite the fact that he 
clearly recognized, as the quotes above indicate, the di5erences between American and 
British political cultures and has also recognized the very di5erent role that law plays in 
American law than in British law, he apparently did not think this poses a challenge to his 
views on the general nature of law. %is, of course, is consistent with his view that there 
are underlying similarities between legal systems. It is, however, equally consistent with 
the possibility that Hart generalized from his own image of the British legal system to a 
general view about what law is. 
Matters are quite di5erent in the case of Dworkin. For him the constant contact 
between law and politics is perhaps the central background problem that calls for 
solution. Dworkin therefore starts his analysis at a point that those who wish to maintain 
the separation of law from politics would already Qnd unacceptable: “Judicial decisions,” 
he says, “are political decisions.”26 %us, the separation between law and politics, in the 
way it is understood in British law—two (largely) non-overlapping domains—is o5 the 
table from the start. Instead, Dworkin seeks to solve the problem by relying on a 
distinction between what I will designate as “politics” and “Politics.” %e former is what 
one sees on TV: spin, corruption, simplistic slogans, talking points instead of argument. 
%e other, Politics, is commitment to principle through the exploration of the moral 
requirements involved in living in a community. %e distinction between “politics” and 
“Politics” is mine, not Dworkin’s, but he e5ectively adopts it when he says that in a 
community governed by “the model of principle” members of the community “accept 
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that they are governed by common principles, not just by rules hammered out in political 
compromise.” And he adds: “Politics has a di5erent character for such people. It is a 
theater of debate about which principles the community should adopt as a system….”27  
What is the role of law in this? Dworkin’s answer is that law, properly understood 
and practiced, is true Politics. %e Qrst step in the argument is that “our government shall 
be republican rather than despotic,”28 the second is that law is the main means for 
promoting this republican ideal:  
We have an institution that calls some issues from the battleground of power politics to the 
forum of principle. It holds out the promise that the deepest, most fundamental conRicts 
between individuals and society will once, someplace, Qnally, become questions of justice. I 
do not call that religion or prophecy. I call it law.29 
Law and lawyers thus have a dual role within the American polity: one is to elevate by 
their example politics into Politics; the other is to limit the domain of politics by 
transferring certain questions from politics to law (and thus to Politics) if politics cannot 
be transformed into Politics. %e Qrst strategy is in view in Law’s Empire when Dworkin 
argues that political decision-making should be based on the same principles and 
reasoning that guide legal decision-making.30 Elsewhere Dworkin explains that political 
institutions could rise to the level of Politics only under what he calls “partnership 
democracy,” which, as its name indicates, is distinctive for its participatory view of 
democracy—one that works to encourage the kind of political debate he Qnds in the 
workings of the courts.  
However, when the political community fails to create this form of democracy 
Dworkin is clear in favoring the second strategy: “individual citizens can … exercise the 
moral responsibilities of citizenship better when Qnal decisions involving constitutional 
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values are removed from ordinary politics and assigned to courts, whose decisions are 
meant to turn on principle, not on the weight of numbers or the balance of political 
inRuence.”31  
But even in a partnership democracy, even in court, how can we know that such 
debates would give us the objectively right answer to the questions of Politics? %e 
answer, quite simply, is that the right answer is the best answer to come out of the debate. 
%is crucial point about Dworkin’s position is central to his thinking: the right answer is 
not “out there,” it is simply what emerges as the “winner” in a principled debate. It is 
always open to challenge, but the objectively right answer means, for him, nothing more 
than the best answer in Political discourse.  
Although Dworkin’s particular views depend on various arguments that many do not 
share, it is important to stress that the general outline of this view belongs to a fairly 
familiar concern with articulating a response to perhaps the fundamental dilemma of 
American constitutional law, that of reconciling republican self-government in which law 
comes from “We the people” of the Constitution’s preamble with the higher law, the 
“unalienable Rights,” of the Declaration of Independence. To see this we must step 
outside the narrow bounds of analytic jurisprudence. %ere are many examples of 
discussions that deal with this matter in the constitutional and jurisprudential thought in 
the United States,32 but here I can only mention one. In a well-known essay by Owen Fiss, 
“Law and Objectivity” Fiss sought to address the challenge to objectivity posed by certain 
then-emerging critical scholars.33 Proponents of this “new nihilism” contended, as Fiss 
put it, that “[a]ll law is masked power.”34 Fiss’s response was somewhat di5erent from 
Dworkin’s: unlike the latter who denied the intelligibility of external criticism Fiss 
acknowledged it and even relied on it to distinguish between internal legal criticism and 
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external ethical (or religious) criticism. But what looks at Qrst like a signiQcant di5erence 
turns out to be quite minimal, for as Fiss put it, “[e]ndogenous change is always preferred 
… [and therefore t]he external critic struggles to work within the law…..”35   
One need not accept Fiss’s romanticized view of American law to recognize in his 
words a particular vision of addressing the challenge to the objectivity of law, that seeks to 
Qnd it through engagement in moral and political debate within an “interpretive 
community.”36 %e judges’ authority derives from the fact that they “are insulated from 
the political process” (i.e., what I called politics), but that is so in order for them “to 
engage in a special kind of dialogue over the meaning of [public] values” (i.e., what I 
called Politics). %is judicial engagement with public values is “an essential part of the 
process through which a morality evolves and retains its public character.”37 For this 
reason “courts should not be viewed in isolation but as a coordinate source of 
governmental power, and as an integral part of the larger political system.”38  
I hope it is clear from this discussion where exactly Dworkin’s right answer thesis Qts 
within this picture. In the view of law as Politics, its fundamental point is not guidance 
but participation, for the right answer is what emerges from engagement in the debate; 
however, the judge’s role in this debate is not that of a follower (of rules set elsewhere), 
but primarily as that of a moral leader. For this reason we even Qnd in Dworkin, an 
exhortation for (as Hart put it) the “the sage … [who] may be in the university” to 
provide the answer.39 Dworkin’s answer, then, is not simply that morality contains right 
answers to moral questions, and since it is part of the law, law contains right answers too. 
At bottom his view holds that law can transform political debate and in this way avoid the 
problem of objectivity. If one accepts this view the audacious right answer thesis becomes 
trivial, you might even say tautological. But in the Hartian perspective it is almost 
incomprehensible, for this view is premised on the idea that when politics is introduced 
into the law, political disagreement is simply reproduced within the law. It is hard to see 
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how that could aid the search for legally correct right answers or guarantee the objectivity 
of law. %is view is evident when Hart criticizes those who think that “there is no central 
element of actual law to be seen in the core of central meaning which rules have, that 
there is nothing in the nature of a legal rule inconsistent with all questions being open to 
reconsideration in the light of social policy.”40 For Hart to recognize the existence of law 
is to recognize a domain in which politics, even Politics (“social policy”), cannot touch. 
Legal Validity? 
One occasionally gets a glimpse of these issues in contemporary jurisprudence, but it is 
mostly just of Rickering phantasms rather than the real thing. In particular, the issue is in 
the background of the debate between “inclusive” and “exclusive” legal positivists as it 
touches on the question of limits on lawmaking power.41 In this context the di5erence 
between the British and the American constitutions is explained by saying that there is no 
diZculty with constrained sovereignty, something that the Americans have chosen to 
have whereas the British rejected. I believe it is not hard to feel that this question and the 
competing answers given to it (roughly, the law directs us outside, or the law incorporates 
morality) does not quite grasp the issue at hand.  
%is is but one of the diZculties with the misguided approach (to which Hart and 
Kelsen are most responsible) of treating legal validity as the fundamental concept of 
jurisprudence. I have argued against this view elsewhere, and will not repeat my 
arguments here,42 but instead I will try to illustrate the shortcomings of the perspective 
that tries to explain the di5erence between American and British law discussed above as 
emanating from their having di5erent tests of legal validity. %is view fails to capture the 
sense in which the British constitution is fundamentally a political, not a legal, entity (it is 
diZcult to talk about a “document” in this context). It is a constitutional structure in 
which “[e]verything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing happened that would 
be constitutional also.”43 It is from this that law is understood as simply the voice (the 
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“command,” if you don’t mind my Austinism) of whoever happens to be in power. 
Sovereignty on this view is the power to make laws. %is is a power that the, otherwise 
unlimited, sovereign can choose to limit is an act of self-binding. %is is, e5ectively, the 
way Hart interprets the United States Constitution, and this is how today the Human 
Rights Act is reconciled with the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. By contrast, in 
the United States the Constitution created by the people is thought to award political 
power, otherwise non-existent. As such the law is understood fundamentally not as the 
manifestation of power, but as what sets the limits on it. In the British picture judicial 
engagement in politics is ultimately an illegitimate attempt to usurp political power, in 
the latter it is a necessary, inevitable outcome of the need to set the limits of legitimate 
power.  
%ese two views emanate from two very di5erent underlying political theories about 
what makes the use of power legitimate, and yet all this is treated as irrelevant to 
understanding the nature of law, and one might add exactly because they are political in 
nature. But as we now see, the di5erences between the two countries’ underlying political 
theory result in ways of understanding and structuring law that in very fundamental ways 
are almost opposite of each other. And once we see this, much of what I said above, that 
within the “validity-Qrst” picture remains inexplicable, begins to make sense. %e 
di5erent place of politics with relation to law, and the di5erent responses to the problem 
of objectivity we have seen above, are the result of di5erent understandings of what law is, 
and these can be traced back to the U.S. and Britain di5erent political traditions. 
The Implications for the Search for the Nature of Law 
It is an interesting question, although one that I could not possibly address in much detail 
here, why legal philosophers have spent so much attention on obscure questions relating 
to the connections between law and morality, but have said virtually nothing about the 
connections between law and politics. But if the law-morality interface is considered 
crucial for understanding the nature of law, so, one would think, is also the case with the 
law-politics interface. At least part of the answer probably has to do with the fact that by 
the standards of contemporary legal philosophy much of what I said so far would 
probably be dismissed as not suZciently philosophy. %ere were just too many facts, too 
much history, even a citation to a case.  
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In proper philosophical style, then, let me present a syllogism:  
() %ere is no right answer to what constitutes “true” politics; there is, if you wish, no 
non-political “nature” to politics to be discovered through conceptual analysis.  
() Di5erent states have di5erent forms (“conceptions”) of politics that reRect their 
di5erent values and history.  
() %ere are connections between law and politics. 
() Di5erent understandings of politics result in di5erent roles, understandings, forms 
(“conceptions”) of law in di5erent states. 
() %e di5erent conceptions of law go to the heart of what on any plausible view of the 
matter counts as the nature of law. 
Hence: () %e search for the (single, unique) nature of law is misguided. 
I did not argue for (), but I assume (and hope) it would not be controversial. Denying it 
is hardly going to help the search for the nature of law, for that would only mean that for 
the sake of an account of the latter, legal philosophers (unless they deny ()) would have 
to develop a side-specialty of identifying the true nature of politics. In any case, my 
demonstration of () above can be seen as validation of () as well. () too is, I think, 
uncontroversial. It is the remaining premises, () and especially (), that are likely to 
evoke most resistance, but my argument in the last section has shown, I hope, the very 
di5erent understanding of politics in the two countries, and how result in a profoundly 
di5erent understanding of what law is.  
%ose who wish to reject my argument might contend that at best what my argument 
shows is the need for making discussions on the nature of law more abstract. John 
Gardner once described Dworkin’s work as that of a “theoretically ambitious lawyer,”44 
suggesting that this is not legal philosophy. Perhaps my argument would be classiQed in 
the same way: exactly because my discussion reveals such di5erences between American 
and British law it is irrelevant to the question of the nature of law. Assuming the search 
for the nature of law seeks to identify those things that di5erent legal systems have 
(necessarily) in common, and assuming the relationship between law and politics is not 
one of them, then this shows the matter is not part of legal philosophers’ purview. Rather 
than a reason for criticizing legal philosophers, you might say my discussion so far shows 
that they have been doing a good job by avoiding these issues. 
One may deQne the term “nature of law” any way one wishes and it is deQnitely 
possible to deQne it to mean those necessary features we happen to Qnd in all legal 
systems. Even then I think my argument above shows that one is likely to Qnd much, 
much less than most legal philosophers seem to think. More importantly, if the nature of 
law simply means those things that are necessarily true of all legal systems, then one 
                                                          








would then wonder why this question is of any interest. (Is philosophy in the business of 
collecting necessary truths about things in the world?) %e search for the nature of law 
was presumably considered valuable, because it was believed it that through it one could 
learn something valuable about an existing social practice that in all sorts of ways we 
encounter every day of our lives. It is not at all clear that whatever emerges from the 
search for the “nature of law” so deQned would be in any way illuminating about the 
practice of law. %is solution to my challenge, then, seems more like admission of defeat.  
If the search for the nature of law is to be meaningful, and if it is to bear some 
resemblance for what most people mean when they talk about the “nature of X” such 
inquiry should be understood in quite di5erent terms. I propose, informally, that a fact 
belongs to the nature of a thing if it explains many other facts about it. Slightly more 
formally, a fact F is part of the nature of social practice S if (and only if?) it Qgures in an 
explanation of many features of S. Even the more formal deQnition is still imprecise, but 
for my purposes here it will do. I propose that the way the relationship between American 
and British law and politics is part of each legal system’s nature, as deQned here, for one 
thing we have seen above is that the relationship between each legal system and politics 
was part of the explanation of very many aspects of each; and though I have said nothing 
about it, they are also relevant for explaining some of the di5erences between the content 
of the laws of those legal systems.  
All this does not amount to a logical proof, but it does amount to a demonstration 
that two legal systems have a very di5erent understanding of what law is as a result of 
their di5erent understanding of the relationship between law and politics, and that this 
di5erence cannot be captured in terms of legal validity, currently the central organizing 
concept of analytic jurisprudence. %ere is, however, a logical challenge I can direct at 
defenders of the nature of law project: the issues raised in this essay can be deemed 
irrelevant only if American law and British law belong to the same kind, otherwise the 
di5erences between them are simply irrelevant to the question of each legal system’s 
respective nature. In other words, there is a di5erent way of understanding my argument, 
i.e. as the claim that American law and British law are di5erent kinds, in which case the 
set of facts I described about each law may be necessary for understanding its nature but 
irrelevant to understanding the nature of the other. Proponents of the nature of law 
assume without argument that American and British law are two species of the same 
kind, but from a logical point of view there is no telling whether they are right on this 
matter or whether my alternative suggestion is correct. Since there is no fact of the matter 
on this question, the assumption that they are—an assumption that is crucial for the 
entire enterprise of the search for the nature of law—is unwarranted. Furthermore, this 
assumption can only make sense if one implicitly assumes some further substantive views 








the ground by presupposing the truth of certain premises that are presented at the end of 
the inquiry as Dndings about the nature of law. (%is problem is complicated many times 
over when other legal systems, contemporary, historical, some may even want to add 
hypothetical, are added to the story.) 
To amplify this last point imagine you had been asked to o5er an account of the 
nature of American law or the nature of British law, a sort of account of the central 
features of the legal system, one that includes the understanding of lawyers in each of 
these legal systems as to the enterprise they are engaged in. We could then conclude that 
British and American law belong to the same kind only at the end of our inquiry, if we 
found out that the accounts we o5ered turned out to have a roughly identical core (the 
nature of law) and some di5erences at the edges (which account for the unique features of 
each legal system). But if we tried that and found out that the accounts were conRicting, 
that would imply that these two legal systems do not belong to the same kind. A di5erent 
way of putting this point is that one can embark on the search for the nature of law only 
aSer having an account of at least some di5erent legal systems. %is essay can be read as 
an attempt to show that if we tried doing that, we would Qnd that the natures of at least 
the British and the American legal systems conRicted. Of course, I may be wrong about 
this, but until something like this is tried—and I know of no legal philosopher writing on 
the nature of law who tried to do that—the entire project rests on wholly question-
begging assumptions.  
Perhaps, however, we may understand the search for the “nature of law” more 
weakly, i.e., as not actually concerned with Qnding the nature of law. Instead this term 
might simply designate an attempt to look at law from some greater distance, without any 
classiQcatory commitment. Is the di5erence between my views and those of legal 
philosophers looking for the nature of law nothing more than that they prefer the long 
shot view whereas I am more interested in the close up? I do not deny that standing at 
some “distance” from a phenomenon can reveal what a closer look may miss.45 Even 
understood in this more relaxed way, however, there is a serious problem with it, for if 
this is the reason for the search for the nature of law, then the right distance from the 
object of inquiry is not to be determined by the object of inquiry. Rather, it has to be 
chosen by legal philosophers according to criteria that are external to the object of 
inquiry. Since there is no correct degree of “zoom” Qxed by the object, the only 
appropriate level way of choosing between various possible distances must be determined 
according to instrumental standards pertaining to what we gain from the explanation. If 
that is the case, my view is that in their search for the nature of law legal philosophers 
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have been standing too far from the law, and that some of the debates that preoccupied 
legal philosophers in the last few years under the banner of the nature of law were deeply 
unilluminating of their object of inquiry. Don’t take my word for it: on this interpretation 
of the search for the nature of law, the lack of interest by others, legal academics, but also 
moral and political philosophers (let alone practitioners or lay people), is more than 
suggestive of the fact that the distance from the object chosen by legal philosopher is the 
wrong one.  
Opting for the distant explanation can also lead to the opposite problem, viz. the 
tendency to assume the local and familiar is general and universal. I have already argued 
that this was the case in the work of both Hart and Dworkin. Let me illustrate this point 
with another example. A few years ago there was an internet debate on the question why 
Anglo-American legal scholars take relatively little interest in the work of Hans Kelsen 
and in deontic logic, both topics on which legal philosophers from continental Europe 
write much more. %e debate attracted many prominent legal philosophers, who o5ered 
various explanations.46 I read this exchange and was struck by the fact that, with the 
exception of one Reeting comment (by an Italian, made with regard to Kelsen), no-one 
mentioned what I thought was the obvious explanation. Kelsen’s legal thought, despite 
his many years in the United States, remained Qrmly rooted in a particular conception of 
law that is closer to what one Qnds in civil law systems. Once it is recognized that for all 
its abstraction Kelsen’s approach Qts some legal systems better than others, the puzzle is 
solved. %e same is true of deontic logic. Deontic logic would be considered important for 
analyzing legal argument within a legal system that puts a premium on deductive 
argumentation. %is is exactly what one Qnds. A prominent German legal scholar has 
recently written that even today “[t]he typical German judgment, like its French 
counterpart, strives aSer the ideal of deductive reasoning.”47 By contrast, legal 
philosophers from common law jurisdictions, who from Day  of law school hear that 
“[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience,”48 are much less likely to 
think that deontic logic is going to capture anything important about the law.  
                                                          
46 See http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg///why-no-deontic-.html; http://prawfs 
blawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg///why-no-kelsen.html; http://leiterlegalphilosophy.typepad.com/ 
leiter///why-dont-amer-.html (all visited, Apr. , ).  
47 See Reinhard Zimmermann, “Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture,” in Introduction 
to German Law (%e Hague: Kluwer Law International, ) , , also at ; see also B.S. Markesinis, 
“Conceptualism, Pragmatism and Courage: A Common Lawyer Looks at Some Judgments of the 
German Federal Court,”  American Journal of Comparative Law ,  (). 
48 O.W. Holmes, e Common Law (Boston: Little, Brown, ) . American philosophers have 
expressed similar views. See John Dewey, “Logical Method and Law,”  Philosophical Review  








I point out these vestigial localisms in supposedly general theories of the nature of law 
not in order to castigate particular legal theories for their insuZcient generality, but to 
point out that legal philosophers’ tendency to stand far away from legal practice, their 
relative lack of interest in the nitty-gritty details of the organization of particular legal 
systems, adopted in the name of the search for the nature of law may result in too quick 
generalizations from few familiar cases.  
Perhaps noticing the diZculties with talking about the nature of law in general, 
several legal philosophers have turned in recent years to talking about “our” concept of 
law.49 %is seems like a more modest claim than the universalistic search for “the” nature 
or concept of law, but the problem of demarcation mentioned above arises here as well: 
Quite simply, there is no logical way of demarcating “our” concept of law without 
circularity unless we have a non-question begging way of demarcating who “we” are, and 
none of those who suggested this idea have even hinted towards a way of addressing this 
question. %is is not a fanciful complaint. In challenging the search for the nature of law I 
relied not on anthropological studies of small pre-industrial communities living in the 
thick of the Amazon rainforests, not on the law of an ancient and now extinct political 
community, not on the law in contemporary Eastern Europe,50 not even on the 
distinction between common law and civil law that some have suggested involved some 
fundamentally di5erent ways of thinking.51 I looked at the two legal systems from which 
the most prominent analytic legal philosophers hail, two legal systems that share a long 
history. If “our” does not include both of them, I do not see what this word is supposed to 
cover.  
At this point the challenger may reply that I am wrong to say that we have no way of 
knowing that American and British law are not the same kind: aSer all, people treat them 
as belonging the same kind, which is why, for example, they consider it a valuable exercise 
to compare them. %is response, however, is both unconvincing and self-defeating. It is 
                                                                                                                                                               
many other statements expressing the same idea from English and American judges and scholars see 
Stephen Waddams, Dimensions of Private Law: Categories and Concepts in Anglo-American Legal 
Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ) -.  
49 See in particular Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, ) -. 
50 Neal Ascherson, “Law v. Order,” London Review of Books,  May , at  (“when [Putin] 
says ‘law’ he means what we would call ‘order’”). For more on what law means in contemporary Russia 
see Je5rey Kahn, “%e Search for Rule of Law in Russia,”  Georgetown Journal of International Law 
 (); Marina Kurkchiyan, “%e Illegitimacy of Lwa in Post-Soviet Societies,” in Law and Informal 
Practices: e Post-Communist Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, D.J. Galligan & Marina 
Kurkchiyan eds., ) . 








unconvincing, because it is asserted rather than shown. %e fact that people use the same 
word to describe both is not suZcient to tell us that the word is used to refer to the same 
kind. (We are, aSer all, repeatedly reminded that legal philosophy is not lexigraphy.) %is 
usage is perfectly acceptable for everyday purposes, but it does not require commitment 
to the view that the things described by the same word share certain necessary features. In 
fact, my guess is that if you asked some British lawyers what they thought of American 
law, many of them would reply “it is not really law, it is politics masquerading as law,”52 
or at least would have said that law in U.S. is a very di5erent beast from law in British.  
%is answer is also self-defeating because if we take people’s attitudes seriously then 
we should pay at least as much attention to their profound thoughts and self-
understanding of their own legal system than to their superQcial comparisons with others. 
Put di5erently, one cannot invoke people’s attitudes at one point and ignore them 
completely at another. And it has been exactly my claim that those attitudes are 
profoundly di5erent in Britain and the United States. 
Some Further Objections 
I foresee four additional objections to the position taken here. %e Qrst is that the 
argument must be wrong because the existence of debate and controversy on the question 
of the nature of law shows that there is something that the disputants are talking about. 
Andrei Marmor says at one point that “controversy over the content of a rule of 
recognition does not prove that there is no such a rule. Even when there are several ways 
of understanding a rule (or anything else for that matter), there must be something there 
that people can understand di5erently and argue about.”53 %e context of the argument is 
speciQc, but Marmor’s parenthetical remark shows he considers his point to be general. 
Transferred to our context the argument would be that the fact that people disagree about 
the nature of law shows that such a thing exists. Unfortunately, this is a bad argument. 
Controversy may be the result of shared mistaken belief over the existence of something 
that in fact does not exist. No-one (I hope) would infer the existence of God from the 
existence of debates about the nature of God. In our context, debates about the nature of 
                                                          
52 I have not conducted a survey but for two contemporary academic lawyers who come close to 
saying just that see Robert Stevens, “Torts” in e Judicial House of Lords -, supra note , at 
, ; Peter Birks, “Equity in Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy,”  University of Western 
Australia Law Review , - ().  
53 Andrei Marmor, Positive Law and Objective Values (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ) . 








law could exist so long as participants share the mistaken belief that such a thing exists. 
%e purpose of this essay is exactly to challenge this belief.54 
A second objection is the opposite of one of the objections considered above, i.e. that 
I have rigged the argument in my favor by my choice of two very di5erent legal systems. 
%ere is American exceptionalism (including American legal exceptionalism) on one side 
and British exceptionalism (not having a written constitution) on the other. If I had 
chosen di5erent countries, I would not have gotten such di5erent outcomes. %ere are, 
however, several problems with this objection. One is, of course, that in some respects the 
American and the British legal systems are fairly close: they are both legal systems of 
Western developed countries with a long shared history. And as already mentioned, these 
happen to be the countries from which the most prominent analytic legal philosophers 
come from, and it is very rare indeed to hear them thinking of either (or both) of these 
legal systems as somehow an outlier in the search for the nature of law (especially when 
the whole point of the search for the nature of law is to Qnd those features from which 
there are no outliers).55 %e most important point, however, is that once one starts 
looking closely virtually every country is “exceptional” in one way or another. French law 
and German law are the paradigmatic examples of civil law jurisdictions, and yet there are 
important fundamental di5erences between them; German law has served as the model of 
much Chinese law, but there are fundamental di5erences between them as well. %is does 
not entail (nor did I argue) that each legal system has its own “nature,” and nothing 
illuminating can be said about law in general. It says, however, that observations true of 
many, even all, legal systems should be the Qndings at the end of an investigation, not the 
starting point.   
%is point leads to the third challenge, and that is that my argument in fact shows 
that law has a nature, namely that the law is concerned with objectivity. %e critic may 
even go on to quote me saying that there is “tension between the aims for objectivity in 
the law and its subject-matter.” Can I make this statement without assuming law has 
some nature? %is is an important point for clarifying the scope of my argument. First, I 
do not deny that there are certain observations true of both American and British law. 
%ere may even be observations true of legal systems more generally. But to observe at 
                                                          
54 In fact, I argue elsewhere that the opposite is true: the existence of persistent controversy on 
jurisprudential question is a serious challenge to another aspect of the search for the nature of law, 
namely the claim that jurisprudence is descriptive. See Dan Priel, “%e Simple Argument against 
Jurisprudential Descriptivism” (unpublished manuscript). 
55 For a rare (and perhaps for this reason, neglected) exception see P.S. Atiyah & Robert S. 
Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal 
eory, and Legal Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ). See in particular the discussion on 








legal systems and notice some things they have in common is not philosophy, and it is 
best done with recognized fact-gathering techniques that, to put it gently, are not the 
mark of contemporary legal philosophy. Second, there may be some “philosophical” 
questions (whatever that means exactly) that arise with regard to many, perhaps even all 
legal systems. But these “puzzles,” as I called them elsewhere,56 need not, singly or 
together, amount to anything that could plausibly be called the nature of law (unless one 
uses this term in the purely technical sense mentioned above), nor do these puzzles 
become less puzzling if they are found to be true of only some legal systems. Most 
importantly, there is no reason to think in advance that even if the same puzzle arises in 
all legal systems, that the answer to it will be the same in all legal systems. To pick a 
favorite puzzle, it is perfectly possible that we will have one explanation for the 
normativity of law in a contemporary modern welfare-state democracy and quite another 
one in a medieval feudal society. We have seen a di5erent understanding of the 
relationship between law and politics in between British and American law; the 
di5erences may be even greater in a place where an absolute monarch declares “the state 
is me.” Since law is not something that falls on societies from the sky with a note “take me 
or leave me” attached, it can be (and has been) molded according to the particular 
political culture in which it exists. %is claim is uncontroversial with regard to legal 
content, but we have no basis to assume it stops there and does not a5ect other aspects of 
law.  
%e last objection I can foresee is that what I have argued so far is a kind of a skeptical 
claim. As such it may be an amusing intellectual game, but like other skeptical claims we 
should really ignore it and go on with our daily business, including philosophers’ daily 
business, which has always been the identiQcation of the nature of things. However, if my 
claim is “skeptical” in any sense, it is skeptical only with regard to a particular, and in 
historical terms recent, understanding of jurisprudence. In the English-speaking world it 
was, at the earliest John Austin who understood the domain of jurisprudence in this way 
(and I would argue that even he is a questionable case). Before him there is simply no-one 
that I know of, deQnitely not Bentham or Hobbes, who was concerned with the question 
of the nature of law in the manner this term is understood these days. It was only around 
QSy or so years ago that Anglophone legal philosophy turned in earnest to this question 
(in German-language jurisprudence things may have begun a bit earlier). %is happened 
at a particular point in history, when other branches of Anglophone philosophy were also 
interested in questions of a similar kind; and yet in other areas these questions were fairly 
quickly abandoned: already in  Brian Barry, who knew a thing or two about the time 
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and place in which this sort of inquiry Rourished, wrote mockingly about questions of 
this sort, “I cannot remember when I last read a discussion about the criteria for a good 
cactus or an extra-fancy apple.”57 It is, I think, no coincidence that the revival in political 
philosophy, pronounced dead in s, began exactly at the time that these questions 
were abandoned, and by now, in many branches of philosophy the search for the “nature” 
of things is being challenged, or has been largely abandoned.58  
From the Nature of Law to Human Nature? 
Does this mean that it makes no sense to talk about the “nature” of law? If we mean 
by this term what it meant to most legal philosophers in the last QSy years, then the 
inevitable answer is “yes.”59 Perhaps, however, there is a completely di5erent way of 
thinking about this question. Perhaps the nature of law is not a matter to be discovered by 
                                                          
57 Brian Barry, “And Who Is My Neighbor?,”  Yale Law Journal ,  (). But unlike other 
areas of philosophy this sort of question seems to be alive and well in jurisprudence. See Julie Dickson, 
“Is Bad Law Still Law? Is Bad Law Really Law?,” in Law as an Institutional Normative Order 
(Maksymilian Del Mar & Zenon Bankowski eds., ) . It is notable that it is mostly legal positivists 
who seem concerned about these sorts of questions, whereas natural lawyers like Finnis and Dworkin 
dismiss them as unimportant. %is should have alerted legal positivists to the fact that these natural 
lawyers are not in the business of giving an analysis of the nature of law, but rather of giving a political 
(non-neutral) account of law. Many of the apparent tensions Dickson Qnds in the work of Finnis, ibid. 
at -, disappear once this point is realized. For a detailed explanation of the di5erence between the 
two projects, with special reference to the work of Dworkin, see Priel, supra note .  
58 See e.g., in metaphysics: Bas C. van Fraasen, e Empirical Stance (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, ) ch.  (entitled “Against Analytic Metaphysics”); in epistemology: Stephen P. Stich, e 
Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic eory of Cognitive Evaluation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
) - (section entitled “%e Irrelevance of Analytic Epistemology”) and Philip Kitcher, “%e 
Naturalists Return,”  Philosophical Review  (); in ethics: Stephen Darwall et al., “Toward a Dn-
de-siècle Ethics: Some Trends,”  Philosophical Review ,  () (describing how “[m]oral 
philosophers shed the obsessions of analytic metaethics”) and Mark Timmons, Morality Without 
Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism (New York: Oxford University Press, ) - 
(describing the move from analytic to post-analytic metaethics); in philosophy of mind: Jerry Fodor, 
“Water’s Water Everywhere”, London Review of Books, Oct. , , at ; and see generally Gilbert 
Harman, “Doubts about Conceptual Analysis,” in Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (New York: Oxford 
University Press, ) . %ey could all be wrong, of course, but to suggest that abandoning the 
search for the nature of law is somehow anti-philosophical displays lack of awareness on what some of 
the world’s leading philosophers think is (and is not) philosophy.  
59 For the sake of completeness I should add that my argument here is not the only one I have 
advanced against this sort of inquiry. See Danny Priel, “%e Boundaries of Law and the Purpose of Legal 
Philosophy,”  Law and Philosophy  (); Priel, supra note . Against the “case study” approach 








a priori reRection on law, but rather by looking more at humans and their nature. %is 
idea may sound new, but it is in fact one as ancient as jurisprudence, and it is only the 
lack of interest of most legal philosophers in the history of their subject (prior to ) 
that has obscured this point. It is part and parcel of the natural law tradition, and it is also 
central to the work of those oSen considered the Qrst legal positivists, %omas Hobbes 
and Jeremy Bentham. It is only the turn away from this idea in the work of Austin and 
especially Hart that jurisprudence lost touch with this idea, and consequently lost its 
way.60   
%e rejuvenation of this idea has been coming from di5erent quarters. Building on 
work in psychology and anthropology that identiQed numerous traits and habits found in 
all human societies,61 there have been some attempts to extend these ideas to law.62 
Without passing judgments on any of the particular ideas defended in these works, I will 
say that I am sympathetic to the view that scientiQc Qndings could contribute to questions 
that have traditionally been thought to belong to philosophy.63 It is worth bearing in 
mind, however, that at this stage the research this work is based on is still controversial, 
and the application of these recent Qndings to law raises further diZculties. I cannot 
discuss these issues here, but I wish to highlight two points about how di5erent this 
approach would be from the currently dominant view in jurisprudence. First, these 
inquiries rely heavily on factual discoveries of social and cognitive scientists, whose 
methods are very di5erent from those of contemporary legal philosophy. Second, the 
substantive results of this approach are also likely to look quite di5erent from those of 
contemporary jurisprudence. %e “direction” of their argument is from human nature to 
the nature of law, rather than from observations about law to the nature of law. Fully 
                                                          
60 See Dan Priel, “Toward Classical Legal Positivism” (unpublished manuscript). Hart, I should 
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61 See Steven Pinker, e Blank Slate: e Modern Denial of Human Nature (London: Penguin, 
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(); see also John Mikhail, “Moral Grammar and Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal Model of 
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63 See generally, Dan Priel, “Jurisprudence Between Science and the Humanities,”  Washington 
University Jurisprudence Review (forthcoming ); Dan Priel, “Jurisprudence and Psychology,” in 








cognizant of the fact that there are considerable di5erences between legal systems, this 
sort of approach is unlikely to try to distil the few features that make something into a 
legal system, but rather try and identify what facts about human nature entail (if anything 
at all) about the shape legal institutions are likely to take. %ough the aspiration is to 
identify some such universal tendencies, it does not require the discovery of necessary 
truths.  
Ending on this note may seem to undermine the thrust of the whole essay. %e essay 
seems to advance a kind of “relativistic” thesis, which aims to challenge the nature of law, 
but then suddenly in the end a “universalism” of sorts seems to be back. To me, however, 
this challenge only reRects one of the most diZcult questions in the explanation of all of 
human a5airs, namely how to reconcile universal human nature with immensely di5erent 
cultures. Swings in popular and academic views on the matter—the sixties and seventies 
were the “relativistic,” and now universalism is back in fashion64—reRect the extent to 
which this complex question may be inRuenced by shiSing fashions, but it seems clear 
that there is quite a bit of both in all human societies, and that a complete account of 
social institutions would have to take account of both.  
Legal philosophers may have thought that they could contribute to the universal end 
of the inquiry, but it increasingly looks as though philosophy can say relatively little on 
the question of human nature. Science has taken over this task, and philosophers can (at 
best) only look from the sidelines and suggest further avenues of inquiry. If philosophy is 
to make a contribution it must be elsewhere. It can be helpful in specifying the normative 
roles that di5erent social institutions play in society, and perhaps even more than that, it 
can serve as the go-between trying to connect the general, scientiQc inquiry on human 
nature with the diverse, normative examination of diverse social institutions. %at, 
however, would require legal philosophers to abandon their aloof attitude towards other 
methods of inquiry about law and try to integrate this learning into their work.  
Conclusion 
%is is a story with an interesting twist. Much of the work in jurisprudence of the last QSy 
years has been concerned with the discovery of objective truth about the “nature” of law. 
What I argued is that to Qnd the answer to this question one needs to understand the way 
the idea of objectivity in law is understood, and how di5erent understandings of this idea, 
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or more precisely how di5erent legal systems responded to the problem of the objectivity 
of law because of the di5erent ways in which the relationship between law and politics is 
understood in these legal systems. If one accepts that there is no one way of 
understanding the relationship between law and politics and that the way this 
relationship is understood touches upon and a5ects the most basic aspects of legal 
systems, then it follows that there is also no single answer to the question of the nature of 
law.  
Why has this conclusion eluded some very sophisticated thinkers? One reason must 
be that the debate about the nature of law has been framed as a debate about the 
relationships between law and morality. Morality is usually thought to be immutable,65 
which suggests that at least the relationship between law and morality would turn out to 
be some kind of universal conceptual truth. (%is is true also of moral anti-realist legal 
philosophers such as Kelsen or Alf Ross.) But the focus on the relationships, necessary or 
otherwise, between law and morality has obscured from view a di5erent, and arguably far 
more important, question about the relationship between law and politics. Understanding 
this relationship calls for more attention to law’s daily workings—the way judges 
understand their position in relation to other branches of government, the way judges are 
appointed, the way they write their opinions, the way law is taught, and, as the quotes 
with which I began show, also the way political elites perceive the right way of solving 
social problems. One of the unfortunate implications of the focus on the “nature” of law 
within jurisprudence is that those working in jurisprudence have come to see all this as 
irrelevant detail, not suZciently interesting or important for serious philosophical 
reRection. %ere has been, if you will, a growing gulf, almost a conceptual separation, 
between law and jurisprudence. If nothing else, I hope this essay has shown what 
detrimental e5ect this has had on legal philosophy.  
  
                                                          
65 I say “usually” because not everyone accepts this. My view is that Dworkin rejects this position. 
%is by itself is a signiQcant aspect of his work, that is very relevant to understanding his jurisprudence, 








Appendix (taken from “The Place of Legitimacy in Legal Theory”) 
Legal positivists think of jurisprudence in the following way: 
 
 
%ey also think that all legal philosphers share this picture, and that therefore the disagreement 
between legal positivists and anti-positivists is about the right way of understanding the conditions 
of legal validity. But this is a mistake, both as a matter of describing others’ views, and as a matter 
of philosophy. I believe, for example, that Dworkin arranges these concepts in the following way: 
 
%is is not the only possible arrangement of these concepts, but it is clear (to me) that the 
approach of contemporary positivists (but not of Hobbes or Bentham), that puts validity in the 
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